January 5th, 2011

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Mere Projections Cannot Constitute Fraud

Wednesday, January 5th, 2011

In Flynn v. Everything Yogurt, et al., 1993 U.S. Dist. Lexis 15722 (D. Md. 1993), the Maryland Federal District Court granted a motion to dismiss a fraud claim for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The Court held that ““Projections of future earnings are statements of opinion rather than statements of material fact. Projections cannot constitute fraud because they are not susceptible to exact knowledge at the time they are made. Layton v. Aamco Transmissions, Inc., 717 F. Supp. at 371 (D. Md. 1989); See also, Johnson v. Maryland Trust Co., 176 Md 557, 565, 6 A.2d 383 (1939) (statement referring to value of securities representing collateral for the payment of trust notes was a matter of expectation or opinion). Thus, the Defendants’ projections can not constitute statements of material fact under § 14-227(a)(1)(ii).”

The Maryland Federal District Court also held in Payne v. McDonald’s Corporation, 957 F.Supp. 749 (D. Md. 1997) that claims of fraud against McDonald’s must be dismissed: “McDonald’s projections concerning the future building costs of the Broadway restaurant and concerning the impact of new restaurants on future sales of the Broadway facility are just as much predictions of ‘future events’ as are projections of future profits. Accordingly, this Court concludes that it was unreasonable for plaintiff Payne to rely on any of McDonald’s predictive statements as a basis for the assertion of fraud-based claims in this case.”

In addition to the McDonald’s case cited above, see Miller v. Fairchild Industries, Inc., Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., and Hardee’s v. Hardee’s Food System, Inc., all of which stand for the proposition that predictions or statements which are merely promissory in nature and expressions as to what will happen in the future are not actionable as fraud.

New York Franchise Act Inapplicable Where Franchisee Resides Outside New York

Wednesday, January 5th, 2011

In the recent case of JM Vidal, Inc. v. Texdis USA, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93564 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), the New York District Court held that the New York Franchise Sales Act is inapplicable to the sale of franchises by a franchisor based in New York where the franchisee resides outside of New York and the franchised business is based outside of New York. In Vidal, a franchisee located in Washington State brought an action against a franchisor that was incorporated in Delaware and maintained its principal place of business in New York.

The franchisee alleged that the franchisor violated the New York Act by: (i) selling a franchise before it registered the UFOC; (ii) failing to timely deliver the UFOC at or before the initial meeting; and (iii) misrepresenting the estimated future earnings of the franchised unit, among other claims.

The Court dismissed the franchisee’s New York Act claim by holding that the New York Act is inapplicable and unavailable in an action by an out of state franchisee in a claim against a New York-based franchisor. The Court determined that the principal place of business of the franchisee is the essential element in the analysis – so that if the franchisee is not based in New York, then the New York Act is not applicable.

In making this determination, the Court relied on previous New York decisions, including Century Pac, Inc. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6904 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2004) and Mon-Shore Mgmt., Inc. v. Family Media, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Vidal stated that “only the franchisee’s domicile matters for the purposes of determining whether the statute applies.”

This case should be reviewed carefully by Maryland franchisors and franchisees, and their lawyers, since the specific jurisdictional language of the New York Franchise Act that was at issue in this case is nearly identical to that contained in the Maryland Franchise Act.